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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the evolution of jurisprudence in cases regulating campaign finance in 
order to propose a lasting solution to increasingly deregulated campaign finance laws. The 
analysis considers legislation and rulings from the first federal campaign finance legislation 
passed in the U.S. in 1876 to the most recent holding in McCutcheon, et al. v. Federal 
Election Comission (2014). The Court’s rulings remained somewhat inconsistent until the 
retirement of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in 2006. After she was replaced by Justice 
Samuel Alito, the Court struck down most all campaign finance limitations. The recent 
decisions in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010), SpeechNow.Org v. 
Federal Election Commission (2010), and McCutcheon have focused so extensively on the 
conceptual right to speech that they have suppressed, not protected, it. The lack of limitations 
is an issue because political influence is shifting from the general public to wealthy 
individuals and groups. Legislation has proven ineffective, so I argue that a lasting solution 
will come from the Judicial rather than the Legislative Branch. The recent passing of Justice 
Antonin Scalia leaves a balanced bench and a chance for reform. I conclude that compelling 
interests considered in such cases are far too limited and that the Court must define a new 
compelling interest, political equality, if it is to establish lasting campaign finance reform.    
Keywords: Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, BCRA, exacting scrutiny, Federal 
Elections Campaign Act, FECA, hard money, soft money, strict scrutiny 
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Introduction 
The 2016 primary elections, thus far, have been one of the most expensive in 
American history with regard to campaign contributions. By the end of March, candidates in 
the 2016 primary elections received over 73 percent more in campaign contributions than 
candidates had by the same point in the 2012 election (Federal Election Commission, 2012; 
2016). This seems to be the result of recent landmark Supreme Court rulings regarding U.S. 
regulations on campaign finance limitations. In a society where corporations and unions can 
now spend unlimited sums of money on independent campaign contributions and 
expenditures, many worry that the voices of individual voters will be muted. Many fear for 
the fate of American democracy (Hasen, 2016).  
Attempts by Congress to regulate campaign finance have failed in that they were 
either too ambiguous or too overreaching to be Constitutional such as the Federal Elections 
Campaign Act of 1971 or the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. Legislation 
regarding campaign finance has either been upheld or struck down in narrow decisions by the 
Supreme Court. The Court’s holdings have depended on whether the bench leaned left or 
right at the time of the decision. The recent death of conservative Justice Antonin Scalia adds 
increased importance to the current state of campaign finance regulation, because his passing 
leaves a balanced bench in terms of findings on prior finance cases. The next justice to be 
appointed to the Supreme Court will likely face an opportunity to reverse or affirm recent 
decisions regarding campaign finance regulations. In order to establish a long-term solution 
to finance regulations, the Court must define political equality as a compelling interest for 
limiting protected speech. 
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Case and Legislation Analysis 
The first Federal campaign finance legislation was passed in 1867. This law 
“prohibited Federal officers from requesting contributions from Navy Yard workers.” 
Congress enacted a series of laws over the next 100 years intended to establish broader 
regulation of campaign finance. Together these laws outlined several primary objectives.  
First, the Government sought to prevent wealthy individuals and groups from 
exercising a disproportionate influence on federal elections by limiting contributions. 
Second, the laws prohibited certain sources of funds for campaign purposes. In addition, the 
government expressed a desire to regulate campaign spending. Finally, the laws attempted to 
deter corruption by requiring campaign finance disclosures (Federal Election Commission, 
n.d.).  
It was not until the Tillman Act of 1907 was enacted that the Government prohibited 
corporations from contributing to Federal campaigns. The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 extended 
this limit, preventing both corporations and unions from contributing to federal campaigns 
and from making independent expenditures (Federal Election Commission, n.d.). All of the 
issues with which these early laws were concerned continued to influence the landmark cases 
that define current campaign finance regulations. 
The Watergate scandal in the early 1970’s brought national attention to the integrity 
of federal election campaigns (Epstein & Walker, 2016; Hasen, 2016). Congress decided to 
amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) in order to reform presidential 
elections, establishing the first major campaign finance reform in U.S. history (Hasen, 2014). 
The amended law limited the amount of money individuals could contribute to candidates, 
FINANCE LIMATIONS AS PROTECTIONS OF FREE SPEECH                                      5 
	  
parties, and political action committees, both to individual campaigns and in the aggregate. It 
also limited independent campaign expenditures. The 1974 amendments, however, did not 
stand long.  
In Buckley v. Valeo (1976) the Supreme Court upheld some of the provisions of the 
1974 amendments and struck down others. Specifically, the Court upheld limitations on 
campaign contributions and struck down those on independent expenditures. This was the 
result of the Court’s application of two different levels of scrutiny to campaign contributions 
and independent expenditures. 
In current jurisprudence, the Court uses two main forms of scrutiny tests, the “strict 
scrutiny test” and the “rational basis test”. Strict scrutiny is applied when a law involves a 
“fundamental right” like free speech. It renders a law unconstitutional unless the law is 
“narrowly tailored” to fulfill a “compelling” government interest. Under the rational basis 
test, laws are upheld so long as they are “rationally related” to a “legitimate” government 
interest (Hasen, 2016). Strict scrutiny tends to favor the challengers of a law while rational 
basis tends to favor the Government. 
The Court, however, did not apply the rational basis test in Buckley. The Court 
explained that expenditure limits “necessarily reduce the quantity of expression by restricting 
the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience 
reached” (p. 19). For this reason, the Court applied “the exacting scrutiny applicable to 
limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression” (Buckley v. Valeo, 1976, 
p. 44). This “exacting scrutiny” is equivalent to strict scrutiny.  
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Conversely, the Court found that contribution limits do not hinder political speech to 
the same extent as independent expenditure limits because contribution limits “permit the 
symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but do not in any way infringe 
the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues.” The Court applied a less exacting 
scrutiny to limitations on contributions, though it noted “contribution and expenditure limits 
operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities.” This was odd 
because, prior to Buckley, any the Court applied strict scrutiny to all issues dealing with First 
Amendment rights. This lesser “but still rigorous” test means that a “significant interference” 
may be sustained if the government can demonstrate a “sufficiently important interest” and 
“means closely drawn to avoid abridgement of associational freedoms” (Buckley v. Valeo, 
1976, p. 16, 25). The lesser exacting scrutiny that the Court applied to contributions serves as 
a more moderate form of scrutiny that falls between the strict scrutiny and rational basis tests 
and is rarely used outside of campaign finance cases (Hasen, 2016). The Court considered the 
act of contribution more important than the amount of contribution. 
The Court considered only one measure as justification in regulating campaign 
finance in the case of Buckley - corruption or the appearance of corruption. The Court 
considered large contributions as creating an environment for corruption to the extent that 
they are provided to secure a “political quid pro quo from current or potential officeholders.” 
It contended however, that such arrangements are difficult if contributions are truly 
independent and do not allow direct communication between the spender and politician. The 
Court found no evidence that such independent spending could corrupt (Buckley v. Valeo, 
1976, p. 45). The Court provided a limited analysis as to how contributions could further lead 
to corruption. 
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In considering the ways in which corruption could extend beyond quid pro quo 
agreements, the Court only noted that concern went beyond bribery and could not be 
prevented solely by the disclosure of contributors’ identities. For this reason, the Court 
acknowledged that Congress was entitled to impose contribution limits in order to prevent 
the “reality or appearance of corruption” (Buckley v. Valeo, 1976, p. 28). Though the Court 
linked the reality and appearance of corruption in this statement, it articulated another way in 
which the appearance of corruption must be considered.  
The Court associated the appearance of corruption with the public’s perception of 
government: “Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual corruption stemming from 
public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual 
financial contributions… Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the 
appearance of improper influence is… critical… if confidence in the system of representative 
Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent” (Buckley v. Valeo, 1976, p. 27). Here 
the Court asserts that the functionality of representative government hinges on the public’s 
perception of its legitimacy.  
The Court ultimately found that preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption 
served as a sufficient interest to limit campaign contributions but not campaign expenditures. 
However, after the Court found that the prevention of corruption did not provide a 
compelling government interest to limit independent expenditures, it considered the 
argument that spending limits were justified by “the ancillary governmental interest in 
equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of 
elections” (Buckley v. Valeo, 1976, p. 48). This interest best aligns with the political equality 
interest advocated later in this paper.  
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The Court rejected the “relative ability” argument, explaining, “The concept that 
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the 
relative ability of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment which was designed to 
secure the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic 
sources, and to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and 
social changes desired by the people” (Buckley v. Valeo, 1976, p. 49). This conclusion, the 
limited quid pro quo consideration of corruption, and the differing levels of scrutiny later 
proved troublesome for the court.  
The years following FECA and Buckley were defined by circumvention of 
contribution limitations and the development of two different forms of contributions. 
Political strategists discovered a loophole in FECA that distinguished contributions to a 
candidate’s political campaign from contributions to political party organizations. This 
created two different types of contributions, dubbed “hard money” and “soft money” 
(Epstein & Walker, 2016). While hard money still fell under FECA regulations, soft money 
was more pliable.  
Hard money is defined as any money given directly to a campaign. Soft money, on 
the other hand, defines general contributions to a political party. Political parties used the 
unregulated soft money to fund advertisements that supported the election or defeat of 
specific candidates without using specific language. Similarly, the soft money loophole 
allowed for increased use of “issue campaigns”. These often promoted or criticized policy 
issues associated with certain candidates. Like soft money ads, these campaigns fell outside 
FECA regulation so long as they did not use certain “trigger words” that expressly supported 
or condemned a candidate, because they did not use terms like “vote for” or “vote against” 
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any specific candidate (Epstein & Walker, 2016; Hasen, 2016). Soft money essentially 
undermined the legal reach of FECA as it became more prominent throughout the 1990s.  
Concerned with the limited ability of FECA to regulate soft money, Congress passed 
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA). Title I of BCRA regulated soft 
money by barring political parties from raising or spending soft money, prevented federal 
candidates and officeholders from receiving soft money, and prohibited local party 
organizations from using soft money to promote or attack federal candidates (Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act, 2002). The legislation attempted to equate all money contributed to 
candidates, national political parties, and local political organizations with hard money 
regulated by federal election laws.  
Title 2 prohibited labor unions and corporations from using their general funds to 
engage in “electioneering communication” or political advertising that refers to a specific 
candidate within sixty days of a general election or thirty days of a primary election. The 
advertisement must also have targeted the relevant constituency during that time period to be 
prohibited. Intended to prevent further issue advocacy, this section required thorough 
disclosure and recording of political advertisements. Media corporations and non-profit 
organizations that took no money from for-profit organizations were exempt from these 
restrictions (Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 2002).  
Titles 1 and 2 drew the most criticism, but another portion of the law raised the limits 
on hard-money contributions in order to compensate for the loss of soft money contributions. 
It even included language allowing limits to be adjusted periodically for inflation. The law’s 
limits, however, were broad in that they regulated contributions to individual candidates, 
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national political parties, and political action committees. In addition, the law imposed a limit 
on aggregate contributions (Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 2002). The law’s provisions 
attempting to compensate for soft money losses did not prevent uproar from various 
organizations. 
The BCRA survived backlash from numerous unrelated organizations, but only by a 
narrow 5-4 decision in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003). Groups that 
rarely side together on public policy issues joined to challenge BCRA. These included the 
National Rifle Association, the National Right to Life Committee, the American Civil 
Liberties Union, the California Democratic Party, the Republican National Committee, and 
others (Epstein & Walker, 2016). The challengers stood behind claims that BCRA violated 
the First Amendment in its prohibitions on soft money and issue advertisements.  
Senator Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., filed a lawsuit consolidating the challenges to the 
law. The Court upheld BCRA against arguments that the Congress had violated the First 
Amendment. The five more-liberal justices found that Congress had the authority to protect 
the integrity of the electoral process by imposing the restrictions in BCRA. Justice John Paul 
Stevens and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor provided the opinion of the Court in upholding 
Title I and II of BCRA, including restrictions on corporate independent expenditure. They 
cited Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990), noting, “We have repeatedly 
sustained legislation aimed at ‘the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations 
of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no 
correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas’” (McConnell v. 
Federal Election Commission, 2003, p. 99). Though Justice O’Connor dissented in Austin, 
she joined the opinion in McConnell. The case served as one of the final campaign finance 
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cases in which she participated before her retirement from the bench, and it marks a major 
turning point in the evolution of campaign finance regulation.  
Justice Samuel Alito replaced O’Connor in 2006. Only five months after his 
appointment to the bench, the Court considered the case of Randall v. Sorrell (2006). Justice 
Alito joined the more conservative justices in striking down a Vermont law that limited 
individual contributions to candidates for statewide office to $400 per two-year election cycle 
($200 for some local offices) and restricted the amount of money candidates could spend. 
The Court reasoned that the Constitution is violated when contribution and spending limits 
are so severe they detract from free speech interests. This logic would become definitive of 
major cases in the following years like Citizens United and McCutcheon. 
Two years later, Alito joined the majority in striking down the “millionaire’s 
amendment” to the BCRA in Davis v. Federal Election Commission (2008). This provision 
applied to wealthy candidates who funded their own campaigns. It allowed supporters of the 
opponent of the self-financing candidate to contribute up to three times the normal 
contribution limits if the self-financing candidate used personal funds in excess of a threshold 
determined by a statistical formula, though the supporters of the self-financing candidate 
were limited by regular contribution ceilings. The amendment intended to prevent any 
advantage on the part of wealthy candidates, but the justices found that it violated the First 
Amendment rights of these candidates. These two smaller cases demonstrated that Alito 
differed from O’Connor in his views on campaign finance regulations. He soon ruled in one 
of the most prominent finance cases in U.S. judicial history.  
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Citizens United is a nonprofit corporation that receives some funding from for-profit 
organizations. In January 2008, it released Hillary: The Movie, a feature-length film which 
portrayed then-senator and Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton in a negative 
light and as unfit for the presidency. Hoping to air the film on cable’s video-on-demand 
service, Citizens United produced advertisements for cable and broadcast television that 
promoted the film.  
Citizens United worried about civil and criminal penalties for violating the campaign 
finance laws established in BCRA since it accepted some money from for-profit corporations 
and intended to use general treasury funds to finance advertisements for Hillary. The 
organization filed a suit against the Federal Election Commission claiming that section 203 
of BCRA is unconstitutional as applied to the film and that sections 201 and 311 are 
unconstitutional as applied to the film and its advertisements. Section 203 holds that 
corporations and unions cannot independently finance electioneering communications with 
general treasury funds, while sections 201 and 311 impose disclaimer, disclosure, and 
reporting requirements (Epstein & Walker, 2016; Hasen, 2016). After a three-judge district 
court ruled in favor of the FEC, Citizens United appealed its case to the Supreme Court. 
Citizens United predicated its argument on several main points: government may not 
suppress political speech unless it is necessary to prevent corruption or the appearance 
thereof; Hillary is not express advocacy and the government has no compelling interest to 
prohibit video-on-demand distribution of the film; and Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of 
Commerce (1990) should be overruled because it defies the well-established principle that 
First Amendment protections do not depend on the identity of the speaker (Epstein & 
Walker, 2016).  
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The FEC reasoned: the Court had approved Congress’ ability to prohibit corporations 
from using general treasury funds to finance express advocacy or its equivalent in Austin and 
since Hillary considers the character and candidacy of Clinton, falls under the functional 
equivalent of express advocacy and there is no exception for feature-length films or video-
on-demand distribution (Epstein & Walker, 2016). The Court, now composed of a 
conservative majority ruled in favor of Citizens United, overruling prior opinions and using 
the case as a means to overrule both Austin and McConnell.  
The case was settled by another narrow 5-4 decision. Justice Anthony Kennedy 
delivered the opinion of the court in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Antonin 
Scalia concurred. Justice Stevens and Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in part and 
dissented in part. Justice Kennedy’s opinion seemed to agree with nearly every claim of 
Citizens United’s argument.  
In considering the role of disclaimers and disclosure regulations, Justice Kennedy 
explained, “Government may regulate corporate political speech through disclaimer and 
disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that speech altogether.” He listed the ability 
of Government to impose disclosure requirements but agreed it did not apply in this case. 
He considered legislation regarding the express advocacy questioned in the case but 
again held that it did not apply. He wrote, “Section 441b [of the U.S. code] makes it a felony 
for all corporations-including nonprofit advocacy corporations-either to expressly advocate 
the election or defeat of candidates or to broadcast electioneering communications…” 
Instead of considering this a precedent by which to evaluate Hillary, he interpreted it as a 
“ban on speech”. He cited Buckley’s language in the claim that by ‘restriction on the amount 
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of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign,’ that 
statute ‘necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues 
discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached’ (Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission, 2010, pp. 20, 22). Justice Kennedy demonstrated an 
interpretation of 441b and Buckley that differed significantly from past opinions of the Court. 
With regards to Austin’s ruling on corporate identity, Justice Kennedy cited Federal 
Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (2007) in describing the Citizens United 
decision as a significant departure from First Amendment principles. He cited Montejo v. 
Louisiana (2009) in claiming that stare decisis requires the continued acceptance of Austin, 
because one of the principles in determining whether or not to apply stare decisis is that the 
prior decision be well-reasoned. He found that Austin is not well-reasoned because the 
government defends it with reference to corruption and shareholder interests, not the 
antidistortion interests it specifically promotes. He even stepped beyond Citizens United’s 
argument against Austin in claiming that the Court must also reconsider McConnell on the 
grounds that its decision rested upon that of Austin (Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission, (2010). The Court overruled both. In this final claim, Justice Kennedy exposes 
himself to serious critique by the dissenting justices.  
Justice Kennedy also agreed thoroughly with the argument that First Amendment 
protections do not rely on the identity of the speaker. He cited eleven prior cases in which the 
Court upheld the First Amendment rights of corporations. He also cited First National Bank 
of Boston v. Belotti (1978), writing, “Under the rationale of these precedents, political speech 
does not lose First Amendment protection ‘simply because its source is a corporation’.”   He 
elaborated, “…Government may commit a constitutional wrong when by law it identifies 
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certain preferred speakers. By taking the right to speak from some and giving it to others, the 
Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the right to use speech to strive to 
establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker’s voice… The First Amendment 
protects speech and speaker, and the ideas that flow from each” (Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission, 2010, pp. 24, 26). This conceptual view of speech, however, does not 
consider that corporate spending might stifle the general population’s ability to speak to more 
of an extent than limitations on spending might stifle the speech of large groups.   
Justice Stevens was extremely critical in his dissent in Citizens United. He explained, 
“The real issue in this case concerns how, not if, the appellant may finance its electioneering. 
Citizens United is a wealthy nonprofit corporation that runs a political action committee 
(PAC) with millions of dollars in assets. Under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
(BCRA), it could have used those assets to televise and promote Hillary: The Movie 
wherever and whenever it wanted to. It also could have spent unrestricted sums to broadcast 
Hillary at any time other than the 30 days before the last primary election.” He continued 
noting that the only dispute between the parties was whether or not Citizens United had the 
right finance broadcasts in the 30-day period before the primary election with general 
treasury funds (Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 2010, p. 1). The ruling in 
the case far exceeded the parameters of Citizens United’s argument.   
Stevens saw the Court’s decision as an extreme violation of prior restraint and stare 
decisis, given that the findings far exceeded the true dispute in the case. He criticized the 
Court majority for using the case as a medium for overturning to Austin and McConnell, 
noting that “nothing had changed except the composition of the Court.”  He continued, “Even 
more misguided is the notion that the Court must rewrite the law relating to campaign 
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expenditures by for-profit corporations and unions to decide this case…” (Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission, 2010, p. 1, 23). The Court’s decision may or may not have 
overstepped its bounds in relation to judicial restraint. One certainty is that the decision 
fostered change. 
SpeechNow.Org v. Federal Election Commission (2010) was a case that came on the 
heels of Citizens United. Its finding removed “federal contribution and spending limitations 
on organizations that use their funds only for political expenditures independent of 
candidates or political parties.” Together with the decision in Citizens United, 
SpeechNow.Org created the “Super PAC,” a new form of Political Action Committee that 
may receive and spend unlimited amounts of money on electioneering communications so 
long as it remains independent of any candidate and does not coordinate with any individual 
candidate’s campaign (Epstein & Walker, 2016). The case allowed these organizations to 
spend money outside the campaign finance limitations imposed on candidates and political 
parties, allowing for even more money to be spent on political campaigns. 
The most recent major case regulating campaign finance came in the form of 
McCutcheon, et al. v. Federal Election Commission (2014). FECA as amended by the BCRA 
limits campaign contributions in two ways. First, it places limitations on the amount an 
individual can donate to any particular candidate or organizations. Second, it imposes an 
aggregate limit on campaign donations to all individuals or organizations in a two-year 
election cycle. The base limits for the 2013-2014 election cycle limited individual donations 
to $5,200 to any one candidate, $2,600 for the primary election and $2,600 for the general 
election. It limited donations to a national party committee to $32,400 per year, $10,000 to a 
state or local party committee, and $5,000 per year to a PAC. The aggregate limits allowed a 
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total of $48,600 to federal candidates and $74,600 to other political committees. Of the 
$74,600 only $48,600 could be contributed to state or local party committees and PACs, as 
opposed to national party committees. 
Shaun McCutcheon, chief executive officer of an Alabama engineering company, 
contributed $33,088 to sixteen different candidates, adhering to the base limitations that an 
individual could donate to individual candidates. McCutcheon wanted to contribute to twelve 
other candidates, adhering again to the base limitations for individual candidate 
contributions, but he was prevented from doing so by the aggregate contribution limit. He 
claimed that aggregate limitations would also stifle his planned contributions for the 2013-
2014 election cycle (Epstein & Walker, 2016). McCutcheon joined with the Republican 
National Committee and sued the Federal Elections Commission for violating the First 
Amendment by enforcing aggregate limitations. 
When a three-judge circuit court upheld aggregate contribution limits on the grounds 
of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, McCutcheon appealed his case to 
the Supreme Court. His argument was based on several related points: aggregate limits are 
subject to rigorous scrutiny because they substantially burden First Amendment rights; there 
is no factual support showing that aggregate limits prevent corruption or the appearance 
thereof; and if the base contributions are deemed noncorrupting, then aggregate limits only 
restrict the number of candidates, parties, and organizations an individual may support.  
The FEC limited the reasoning of its argument to precedent. The Commission argued 
only that it is inconsistent with Buckley v. Valeo (1976) in applying strict scrutiny to 
contribution limits and that the Court should consider aggregate limits as constitutionally 
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valid measures to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption (Epstein & Walker, 
2016). The differing levels of scrutiny and narrow definition of corruption applied in Buckley 
worked against the FEC. 
Chief Justice Roberts announced the judgement of the Court and delivered an opinion 
in which Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito joined. He cited Citizens United in his 
explanation, “‘Ingratiation and access… are not corruption.’ They embody a central feature 
of democracy-that constituents support candidates who share their beliefs and interests, and 
candidates who are elected can be expected to be responsible to those concerns” 
(McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 2014, p. 1). Instead, he warned that 
regulations must target the quid pro quo corruption defined previously by the Court.  
The Court ultimately disagreed with the limitation finding in Buckley. Roberts 
explained that the Buckley opinion devoted only three sentences to analyzing the aggregate 
contribution limit and even noted that it “ha[d] not been separately addressed at length by the 
parties.” The opinion noted two ways in which the First Amendment “safeguards an 
individual’s right to public debate” – political expression and political association. Monetary 
contribution to a candidate fulfills both (McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 2014, 
p. 11). 
Buckley acknowledged that aggregate limits diminish the right to political association, 
holding that “the overall… ceiling does impose an ultimate restriction upon the number of 
candidates and committees with which an individual may associate himself by means of 
financial support”, but the Court disagreed with Buckley’s finding that such restrictions 
served as a “modest restraint” in that a donor must limit the number of candidates or policy 
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issues he supports. Requiring one individual to contribute smaller donations in order to 
support more candidates “is to impose a special burden on broader participation in the 
democratic process.” This defies the “robust exercise” of First Amendment rights protected 
in Davis v. Federal Election Commission (2008). After acknowledging issues within the 
FEC’s argument, the majority considered the issues of the dissent’s argument (McCutcheon 
v. Federal Election Commission, 2014, p. 17).  
The opinion of the court listed three “compelling” reasons not to define the 
boundaries of the First Amendment by the dissent’s claim of “the public’s interest” in 
“collective speech”. First, collective speech in the form of law is subject to the will of the 
majority. This is foreign to the First Amendment’s protection of individuals against laws that 
restrict free speech. Second, the degree to which free speech is protected is not subject to 
legislative or judicial determination of whether or not it is useful to the democratic process. 
United States v. Stevens (2010) found that the First Amendment does not consider “ad hoc 
balancing of relative social costs and benefits.” Finally, First Amendment analysis already 
considers “collective interest” as justification for restricting free speech. It falls under the 
“public interest” or “compelling government interest” considered in scrutiny tests. 
The Court agreed with McCutcheon’s argument that if limitations on the amount an 
individual can contribute to individual candidates or parties are sufficient to prevent 
corruption, then the government must prove that aggregate limitations prevent circumvention 
of those limitations. If it cannot, aggregate limitations serve no purpose but to limit the 
number of candidates or parties an individual can support. The Court found that there is no 
clear evidence that aggregate limits prevent such circumvention and so serve no compelling 
interest in limiting free speech. 
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In his concurrence with the Opinion of the Court, Justice Thomas explained the issue 
with the ruling in Buckley, writing, “…Contributions and expenditures are simply ‘two sides 
of the same First Amendment coin,’ and our efforts to distinguish the two have produced 
mere ‘word games’ rather than any cognizable principle of constitutional law. For that 
reason, I would overrule Buckley and subject the aggregate limits in BCRA to strict scrutiny, 
which they would surely fail… I concur only in the judgment” (McCutcheon v. Federal 
Election Commission, 2014, p. 5). 
Justice Stephen Breyer presented one of the best-articulated fears of continued 
deregulation of campaign finance in his dissent of McCutcheon v. Federal Election 
Commission (2014). He wrote, “[Corruption] derails the essential speech-to-government-
action tie. Where enough money calls the tune, the general public will not be heard. Insofar 
as corruption cuts the link between political thought and political action, a free marketplace 
of political ideas loses its point.” Conservative justices’ First Amendment rationale for 
deregulating campaign finance may actually diminish the general population’s ability to 
practice free speech. 
Discussion 
Unregulated campaign finance is a detriment to the public. One recent study found 
that public policy across a range of issues is skewed toward the interests of the wealthy and 
that this trend will only accelerate with the latest developments in campaign finance 
regulation (Martin & Page, 2014). This is similar to Justice Breyer’s dissent in McCutcheon, 
“…Where enough money calls the tune, the general public will not be heard.” If democracy 
is to prevail, then campaign finance reform is necessary. 
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 Some individuals have proposed that a constitutional amendment would provide the 
best means for reforming campaign finance. Justice Stevens, who wrote the dissent in 
Citizens United, retired soon after the Court’s decision. In 2014, he published a book 
proposing six amendments to the Constitution.  The third of the six amendments Stevens 
proposed provides, “Neither the First Amendment nor any other provision of this 
Constitution shall be construed to prohibit the Congress or any state from imposing 
reasonable limits on the amount of money that candidates for public office, or their 
supporters, may spend in election campaigns” (Stevens, 2014, p. 3). He proposes this 
amendment as an option for reversing the Citizens United decision, claiming that the Court’s 
decision may allow entities not qualified to vote, whether they be corporations or non-
residents, greater influence over elections than registered voters.  
I share the opinion of political theorist Richard Hasen (2016, p. 11) that, even if it 
were to pass, “A constitutional amendment to overturn Citizens United is the most prominent 
wrong way to fix the problem…” and that “Such an amendment would likely be too 
damaging to robust political speech or too full of holes to be effective.” Moreover, it is 
unlikely that any such amendment will be passed by elected officials, because members on 
both sides of the aisle benefit from unregulated campaign finance.  
Republicans have united to push for completely unregulated campaign finance. John 
McCain no longer seeks bipartisan reform (Hudson, 2012). Mitch McConnell no longer 
fights for identity disclosure (McConnell’s Hypocrisy, 2010). Ted Cruz accuses Democrats 
of seeking power to stifle free speech (Press Office of Senator Ted Cruz, 2014). It is unlikely 
that Republicans will sponsor reform.  
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The issue of sponsoring reform, however, does not apply only to conservatives. 
Democrats tend to benefit from unregulated campaign finance in two ways – securing votes 
by criticizing the conservative agenda of complete deregulation and receiving money through 
the same means as those they criticize. President Obama criticized the Supreme Court for its 
deregulation of campaign finance, but he reneged on his promise to fix the issue of public 
money in the general election. He even became the first president to turn his campaign 
committee into a “social welfare” group that can accept unlimited, undisclosed donations to 
promote his agenda (Hasen, 2014). The Democratic Party has also proven very successful in 
protecting the interests of Wall Street (Rivlin, 2013). Even if Republicans or Democrats 
chose to support an amendment regulating campaign reform, it would likely fail.  
Forty-three Democratic senators co-sponsored a proposed constitutional amendment 
to “overturn” Citizens United in 2014. Democrats dismissed the questions of free speech 
raised by the amendment without providing a serious response (Senate Democrats, 2014). 
This effort lends further credence to the notion that members of Congress are likely to be 
unsuccessful in any attempt to reform campaign finance through an amendment.  
History also defies the idea that legislation will secure lasting campaign reform. 
FECA and BCRA were considered the two most prominent attempts at campaign finance 
reform in U.S. history (Hasen, 2016). Each failed for different reasons. FECA failed to 
regulate campaign finance because a loophole distinguishing contributions to candidates and 
contributions to political parties allowed the development of soft money. Parties found a way 
to fund ads that supported or critiqued candidates without using specific language regulated 
under FECA (Hasen, 2016; Epstein & Walker 2016). BCRA failed to regulate campaign 
finance because it was too overreaching, and angered groups on both ends of the political 
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spectrum. Though it was initially upheld in McConnell, it was later overturned in Citizens 
United and McCutcheon after a majority shift on the Supreme Court bench. 
It stands to reason that, perhaps, the best way to reform campaign finance is within 
the only branch of government that fosters appointment rather than election. The Court 
decided to strike down the parts of BCRA, and it is likely that it will be asked to rule on 
campaign finance laws again.  
Justice Antonin Scalia practiced the principle of “textualism”, a method of 
considering only the literal text of a law rather than the intention of the writers or the context 
surrounding the law’s origins. In speaking of the opposite principle of “legislative intent” he 
explained, “What I think is needed, however, is not rationalization of this process but 
abandonment of it. It is simply not compatible with democratic theory that laws mean 
whatever they ought to mean, and that unelected judges decide what that is” (Scalia, 1997, p. 
97). Scalia’s preference for this highly literal translation of law typically aligned him with the 
conservative faction of the Court in most cases.  
In Citizens United, he provided a concurring opinion, explaining, “The First 
Amendment is written in terms of ‘speech,’ not speakers.” He noted that in the absence of the 
inclusion of speakers, the Court was left only to consider whether or not the speech being 
considered is speech protected by the First Amendment. In applying this rationale, he agreed 
with the finding that government has no power to “impede” corporate speech, adding, “We 
should celebrate rather than condemn the addition of this speech to the public debate” 
(Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 2010, p. 9). Scalia’s passing leaves an 
empty seat on a Supreme Court bench now balanced in terms of liberal and conservative 
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justices. This provides the opportunity for a situation similar to that of Sandra Day 
O’Connor’s retirement from the bench. Finance reform may come with the next appointment 
of a Supreme Court justice. 
Appointment of a more liberal justice alone may not provide a lasting fix to campaign 
finance restrictions. That action might be consistent with the criticism Justice Stevens 
outlined in his Citizens United dissent. He cited Vasquez v. Hillery (1986) in his criticism of 
the conservative justices, noting, “Today’s ruling thus strikes at the vitals of stare decisis, 
‘the means by which we ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will 
develop in a principled and intelligible fashion’ that ‘permits society to presume that bedrock 
principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals’” (Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission, 2010, p. 23). Lasting reform will require that the 
Court define a compelling interest which can be applied as consistently as the prevention of 
corruption but proves much more effective at regulating campaign finance.  
The issue of whether or not the Court is justified in regulating campaign finance and, 
therefore, free speech, seems to rest, in part, on the reasoning it established and reaffirmed 
through precedent. More often than not, the Court only considers the prevention of 
corruption or the prevention of the appearance of corruption as justifiable means for limiting 
protected speech. In the major cases of Buckley v. Valeo (1976), Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission (2010), and McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission (2014) the 
Court found that only prevention of corruption or the appearance of corruption satisfied the 
strict scrutiny tests applied in cases involving political speech.  
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The prevention of corruption or the appearance of corruption is not a substantial 
enough measure to justify campaign finance reform. Even in its current use, corruption is 
limited to the quid pro quo definition outlined by the Court. The majority in Citizens United 
v. Federal Election Commission (2010) made it clear that “Ingratiation and access… are not 
corruption.” The Opinion of the Court in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission 
(2014) held, “Any regulation must instead target what we have called ‘quid pro quo’ 
corruption or its appearance. That Latin phrase captures the notion of an official act for 
money” (McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 2014, p. 2,3). This is almost 
impossible to prove, and it explains the consistent deregulation of campaign finance by the 
Court. Hasen (2016) explains the insufficiency of the quid pro quo designation. It requires 
that a politician be found to have provided political favors directly to an individual or 
organization that funded the politician’s campaign.   
Corruption has not always been the only justification for limiting political speech. 
The idea was spawned by the finding in Buckley v. Valeo (1976). Even then, the Court 
considered another possibility. After ruling that the prevention of corruption was insufficient 
to limit independent expenditures, the Court considered “the ancillary governmental interest 
in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcomes of 
elections.”  The Court, however, denied the argument on the grounds that “The concept that 
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the 
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment which was designed to 
secure the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic 
sources, and to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and 
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social changes desired by the people” (p. 48). This notion causes as much difficulty now as it 
did in the years preceding Buckley. 
In the 109 years between the first federal campaign finance legislation to the Buckley 
decision, the government implemented a series of laws that attempted to address several 
concerns. Only one of those concerns considers the prevention of corruption. It is covered 
under the language of “deter abuse”. Another concern on the list is “…to ensure that wealthy 
individuals and special interest groups did not have a disproportionate influence on Federal 
elections” (Federal Election Commission, n.d.). The Court might do well to reconsider a 
similar rationale as a compelling interest to limit political speech. 
Establishing a new compelling interest for the regulation of campaign finance is not 
impossible. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990), the Court was able to 
bypass Buckley and Belotti by considering a new government interest: antidistortion. The 
Court found a compelling interest in preventing “the corrosive and distorting effects of 
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and 
that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas” 
(Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 2010, p. 31). This rationale was struck 
down in the Court’s opinion in Citizen’s United because it could also apply to media outlets. 
In order to avoid the same pitfall faced by that of the antidistortion interest in Austin, the 
Court will need to introduce well-reasoned, specific language that outlines the need for 
finance restrictions and adheres to the “compelling interest” component of strict scrutiny.    
Conclusions 
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Increasingly deregulated campaign finance laws are a detriment to the general public, 
analysis of the constants in the evolution of the jurisprudence surrounding campaign finance 
regulation offers insights to a possible solution for lasting reform.  
Reform has not come from elected officials since elected officials of both parties 
benefit from unregulated campaign finance. Past legislative attempts to regulate campaign 
finance have been unsuccessful in that they were either too full of loopholes or too 
overreaching to be effective. 
Most regulations on campaign finance were settled by the Court in by narrow 
decisions that depended on the composition of the Court at the time of the decision. The 
Court evaluated most cases by considering whether or not corruption or the prevention of 
corruption served a compelling government interest to limit protected speech. 
A new, more liberal Supreme Court will need to provide an unambiguous definition 
of political equality as a compelling interest in regulating campaign finance in order to 
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